General Pervez Musharraf embarked upon the political stage through a coup amidst the burning issue of extremism and growing terror in and from Pakistan. To compound to his troubles was 9/11 incident which led America realizing the implications of exporting ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan via Pakistan in the 80s. Yet, the geographical proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan and the very fact that Pakistan has had a prime share in the sense of its involvement in the Afghanistan war theatre in the 80s and ever after led America once again to fall back upon Pakistan as an ally in ‘War on Terror’. The war theatre once again was Afghanistan but the missing link of willingness and the zeal to partner with was what made the situation of immense significance for Musharraf in dealing with the extremist forces in his own country. The paper argues that Musharraf’s U-turn post 9/11 Vis-à-vis Taliban was not complete, rather selective, which in turn was responsible for the less than committed moves on his part to tackle extremist menace in his country. Half-hearted moves led him in a situation bereft of solid support for his moves itself. Whatever move he proceeded with led to a greater reaction from the extremists.
Pakistan, Terrorism, General Parvez Musharraf,Counter Terrorism