

INDIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS: THE TERRORISM AND KASHMIR FACTOR

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ABSTRACT

Recent events have once again generated some curiosity and interest in the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. Basic facts pertaining to this issue are well established. However, there has been a concerted dis-information campaign that presents a distorted historical account of the developments that led to the irrevocable accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to India; the subsequent wars inflicted by Pakistan on India. The involvement of Pakistan in fomenting insurgency and terrorism in the border states of India, especially Jammu & Kashmir, has been well documented and accepted by all impartial observers. While the current violence and disturbances instigated and abetted by Pakistan in the Kashmir Valley, which are there for all to see, the historical perspective needs to be put in the correct, factual light. With this background, the paper tries to focus the factual background of the issue of Jammu & Kashmir and to provide the scrupulous options which will be acceptable to all the parties.

In a real sense, it can be said that terrorism is an enemy of mankind and human rights. Now, the time demands more concrete efforts for meeting the menace. Since the Mumbai carnage, all sections including the media, politicians and intelligentsia have added fuel to the raging fire. But no concrete solution to combat terrorism has emerged. The passing of stringent laws will not prevent a terrorist from acting. He is a terrorist because he has no fear to the law. The modern face of terrorism can be combated only by superior intelligence network which is the key to decide the tactics to be employed to deal with the actual threat. Peace and stability can be resorted not by eliminating terrorists, but by removing the causes of terrorism. Religious and ideological fundamentalism, which is the main sources of terrorism in India and the people of the country, must be encouraged to accept secularism as the way of life.

Foundation of the New Terrorism: Historical and Political Context

Few fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world gained lasting political power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, fundamentalists helped in articulating the anti colonial grievances but played little role in the overwhelmingly secular struggles for independence after the Ist World War. Western-educated lawyers, soldiers, and officials led most

independence movements, and clerical influence and traditional culture were seen as obstacles to national progress. After gaining independence from Western powers following World War II, the Arab Middle East followed an arc from initial pride and optimism to today's mix of indifference, cynicism, and despair. In several countries, a dynastic state already existed or was quickly established under a paramount tribal family (Pati,2009,p38)

Monarchies in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan still survive today. Those in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen were eventually overthrown by secular nationalist revolutionaries. The secular regimes promised a glowing future, often tied to sweep the ideologies (such as those promoted by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab Socialism or the Ba'ath Party of Syria and Iraq) that called for a single, secular Arab state. However, what emerged were almost invariably autocratic regimes that were usually unwilling to tolerate any opposition—even in countries, such as Egypt, that had a parliamentary tradition. Over time, their policies— repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement of popular anger onto scapegoats (generally foreign)—were shaped by the desire to cling to power.

The bankruptcy of secular, autocratic nationalism was evident across the Muslim world by the late 1970s. At the same time, these regimes had closed off nearly all paths for peaceful opposition, forcing their critics to choose silence, exile, or violent opposition. Iran's 1979 revolution swept a Shia theocracy into power. Its success encouraged Sunni fundamentalists elsewhere. In the 1980s, awash in sudden oil wealth, Saudi Arabia competed with Shia Iran to promote its Sunni fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, Wahhabism.

The Saudi government, always conscious of its duties as the custodian of Islam's holiest places, joined with wealthy Arabs from the Kingdom and other states bordering the Persian Gulf in donating money to build mosques and religious schools that could preach and teach their interpretation of Islamic doctrine. In this competition for legitimacy, secular regimes had no alternative to offer. Instead, in a number of cases their rulers sought to buy off local Islamist movements by ceding control of many social and educational issues. Emboldened rather than satisfied, the Islamists continued to push for power—a trend especially clear in Egypt. Confronted with a violent Islamist movement that killed President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Egyptian government combined harsh repression of Islamic militants with harassment of moderate Islamic scholars and authors, driving many into exile. In Pakistan, a military regime sought to justify its seizure of power by a pious public stance and an embrace of unprecedented Islamist influence on education and society. (Pati, 2009, p.39) These experiments in political Islam faltered during the 1990s: the Iranian revolution lost momentum, prestige, and public support, and Pakistan's rulers found that most of its population had little enthusiasm for fundamentalist Islam.

Islamist revival movements gained followers across the Muslim world, but failed to secure political power except in Iran and Sudan. In Algeria, where in 1991 Islamists seemed almost certain to win power through the ballot box, the military preempted their victory, triggering a brutal civil war that continues today. Opponents of today's rulers have few, if any, ways to participate in the existing political system. They are thus a ready audience for calls to Muslims to purify their society, reject unwelcome modernization, and adhere strictly to the Sharia.

Social and Economic Malaise:

In the 1970s and early 1980s, an unprecedented flood of wealth led the then largely un-modernized oil

states to attempt to shortcut decades of development. They funded huge infrastructure projects, vastly expanded education, and created subsidized social welfare programs. These programs established a widespread feeling of entitlement without a corresponding sense of social obligations. By the late 1980s, diminishing oil revenues, the economic drain from many unprofitable development projects, and population growth made these entitlement programs unsustainable. The resulting cutbacks created enormous resentment among recipients who had come to see government largesse as their right. This resentment was further stoked by public understanding of how much oil income had gone straight into the pockets of the rulers, their friends, and their helpers. Unlike the oil states (or Afghanistan, where real economic development has barely begun), the other Arab nations and Pakistan once had seemed headed toward balanced modernization. The established commercial, financial, and industrial sectors in these states, supported by an entrepreneurial spirit and widespread understanding of free enterprise, augured well. But unprofitable heavy industry, state monopolies, and opaque bureaucracies slowly stifled growth. More importantly, these state-centered regimes placed their highest priority on preserving the elite's grip on national wealth. Unwilling to foster dynamic economies that could create jobs attractive to educated young men, the countries became economically stagnant and reliant on the safety valve of worker emigration either to the Arab oil states or to the West.

Furthermore, the repression and isolation of women in many Muslim countries have not only seriously limited individual opportunity but also crippled overall economic productivity. By the 1990s, high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment—a sure prescription for social turbulence. Many of these young men, such as the enormous number trained only in religious schools, lacked the skills needed by their societies. Far more acquired valuable skills but lived in stagnant economies that could not generate satisfying jobs. Millions, pursuing secular as well as religious studies, were products of educational systems that generally devoted little if any attention to the rest of the world's thought, history, and culture. The secular education reflected a strong cultural preference for technical fields over the humanities and social sciences. Many of these young men, even if able to study abroad, lacked the perspective and skills needed to understand a different

culture. (Hersh,1993, p89). Frustrated in their search for a decent living, unable to benefit from an education often obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked from starting families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for radicalization.

Pakistan:

Pakistan's endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern. Millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or Madrassahs. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for them for education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. According to Karachi's police commander, there are 859 Madrassahs teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone. It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. Within Pakistan's borders there are 150 million Muslims, scoring of al Qaeda terrorists and many Taliban fighters. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A political battle among anti-American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military and more moderate mainstream political forces has already spilled over into violence, and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf.

Indo-Pak Conflict-The Intensification of Kashmiri Insurgency

In the midst of the Kashmir Muslim insurgency, tensions between India and Pakistan became so intense that in May 1990, the Pakistani military headed by General Mirza Aslam Beg was willing to use nuclear weapons to "take out New Delhi." It was President Bush's National Security Advisor Robert Gates and Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs who reportedly helped arrest a deadly encounter between them by visiting India and Pakistan. The two countries, however, increased their exchange of cross-border firing along with the Line of Control (LOC). Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was dismissed in the summer of 1990 by Pakistan's President Ghulam Ishaq Khan at the prompting of the military, took a hostile stance toward India to appease the Khan (which she admitted in June 1999) after she was reelected in October 1993. She called India an "imperialistic power and aggressor" in Kashmir. (Evans, 2001,p29)

Despite these hostile relations, India and Pakistan held several rounds of talks at foreign secretary levels between 1990 and January 1994, but without any results as they took irreconcilable positions on Kashmir. For example, Pakistan insisted that India stop its counter-insurgency operations, while India insisted that the talks should focus on Pakistan's cross border aid to the Muslim militants. Following Bhutto, the second dismissal by President Farooq Leghari, at the orders of the military, Nawaz Sharif took office as Prime Minister in February 1997. Indo-Pak relations temporarily thawed. In March of that year, for example, a dialogue at foreign secretary level was resumed. In April, Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan met India's Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in New Delhi, and in May, the two Prime Ministers met at the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit held at Male, capital of the Maldives Republic. At that meeting they agreed not only to resume talks at the foreign secretary level but also to form eight joint "working groups" that would look at, for the first time since 1972, the Kashmir issue. (Bose,1997,121)

Subsequently, by September, the foreign secretaries held three meetings despite of artillery exchanges at a number of points including the LOC. In September, the Prime Ministers met again in New York when they attended the UN General Assembly session. This situation, however, changed after the March 1998 parliamentary elections when the BJP-dominated United Front (known as NDA) won the election and formed a coalition government that took a hard stand against Pakistan. The the-then Home Minister, L. K. Advani, of the new government threatened to go after the terrorists even into the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Indo-Pakistani tensions increased following the nuclear testing in May 1998. This also caused concerns in the international community that the Kashmir conflict would become a catalyst for war that would include the use of nuclear weapons by both countries. Both countries were severely condemned by the international community and the U.S., Japan, and some European countries imposed sanctions. Following mutual testing, the tempers of both countries were so high that on July 29, when Vajpayee and Sharif met at the tenth summit of the SAARC held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the encounter failed to break new ground. Sharif insisted that no progress was possible between the two countries unless the "core issue" of Kashmir was resolved. He characterized the meeting as "zero" and warned that India's "intransigence" was pushing the region to the brink of war. India's foreign secretary, K. Raghunath,

responded by terming Pakistan's obsessive focus on the single issue of Kashmir as "neurotic" and that serious dialogue should not be used to "pursue a limited agenda or promote a propagandist exercise." Intense hostility along with the LOC at that same time left thirty villagers dead and led to a large scale evacuation of people from border areas. (Bose 1997,p139)

In contrast, when they met on September 23, for the second time at the UN General Assembly session, in New York, there was a dramatic change in the tenor of their encounter. It was friendly and they agreed to try to resolve the Kashmir issue "peacefully" and to focus on trade and people to people contact. For example, India agreed to buy sugar and powder from Pakistan. After a decade of absence, Pakistan's cricket team visited India in November 1998. In February 1999, Pakistan allowed India to run buses from New Delhi to Lahore and following an invitation by Sharif, Vajpayee visited Lahore. His visit is commonly known as bus diplomacy and at the end of their summit they issued the Lahore Declaration that was backed up by a clearly spelled out Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In the MOU the leaders agreed to engage in consultations on security matters, to include nuclear doctrines, to initiate confidence building measures in both nuclear and conventional areas, and to establish appropriate communications mechanisms which may help in diminishing the possibility of nuclear war by accident or misinterpretation. They also agreed to continue their respective moratoriums on further nuclear tests unless their "supreme national interest" was in jeopardy.

Conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir: Causes

The problem grew out of the breakup of the English empire in India in 1947 after II World War. Despite the wishes of Mahatma Gandhi, two separate countries were created primarily for religious reasons: India and Pakistan. Pakistan was actually two entirely separate territories on either side of India. In reality, many of the remote areas of the subcontinent such as Kashmir were feudal and had little connection to a national government. These areas were ruled by monarchs known as Maharajas. India was predominantly Hindu, Pakistan was mostly Muslim. At the time of the creation of India and Pakistan the status of Kashmir (a predominantly Muslim area) was left uncertain. Two months after the countries were created; an arrangement was made between the national government in India and the Maharaja of Kashmir which gave control to India. War immediately erupted between India and Pakistan. After a U.N.-arranged

ceasefire in July 1949, Pakistan gained one third of Kashmir territory. The remaining territory was to be under India's control but to have a status of near independence. (Bose,1997,p141)

Despite this arrangement, India formally annexed Kashmir as a state in 1956 which provoked rioting among the Muslim population. War has resumed briefly in the region in 1965 and as part of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan over the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). The Kashmir controversy is a major reason for the present conflict between India and Pakistan. The stakes have been raised because both countries are not parties to the nuclear non-proliferation agreement and have developed nuclear arsenals. (Hersh,1993, p92).

Present Kashmir: Reflection of Pakistan's Support to Terrorism

This support to cross border terrorism is not only an attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo on the ground but also to undermine India's secular fabric. Pakistan's support to cross border terrorism against India is now openly acknowledged by the international community. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the UK Government stated in the British Parliament on 10th June 2002, "A number of terrorist organisations-including Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, have been at the forefront of violent activity in the region. India has long charged that such terrorism has had the covert support of successive Pakistani Governments and, in particular, of the main intelligence agency in Pakistan, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate-ISID. Her Majesty's Government accept that there is a clear link between the ISID and those group.

US Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated on 10th June 2002, "Two weeks ago, we got assurances from President Musharraf that he would cease infiltration activity across the line of control... And then Deputy Secretary Armitage over this past week end got further assurances that cessation of activity would be visible and would be permanent and would be followed by other activities that had to do with the dismantling of the camps that led to the capacity to conduct these kinds of operation". (Sengupta, 1970,p123)

The section on Pakistan in the Annual Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 stated, "Pakistan's military government, headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, continued previous Pakistani Government support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri

militant groups continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre". The report further said that HUM, a State Department designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation, continued to be "active in Pakistan without discouragement by the Government of Pakistan".

Through in 12th January and 27th May addresses, President Musharraf made two promises. Firstly, that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used to promote terrorism anywhere in the world. Secondly, that no organisations will be allowed in indulging in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. (Evans,2001,p69)

Kashmir Developments—An Internal Matter for India

In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are not uncommon. Indian democracy has the necessary resilience to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of our sovereignty, unity and integrity. Government of India has expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate political demands of the people of the state of J&K. However, Pakistan sponsored terrorists have terrorised the population and hindered political dialogue by intimidating or silencing voices of moderation that wish to engage in dialogue. The human rights of the people of J&K have been systematically violated by such terror tactics and the kidnappings and killings of innocent people by terrorists. Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India. There can be no compromise on India's unity and integrity. (Evans,2001,p77)

Installation of a Legitimate Government in Kashmir Failed to End Terrorism

According to foreign and domestic observers, the 2002 September – October state elections held in Jammu-Kashmir were open and fair. Despite the fact that the APHC boycotted the elections in response to coercion by Pakistan and denounced them as sham, and the killing of more than 100 people in an effort to disrupt the elections, forty-five percent of the Kashmiris defied the threats, and voted. Abdullah's party, the NC, the Congress, the BJP, and six other separatist groups took part in the elections. The people rejected the ruling NC reducing its strength to 28 out of total of 87 seats and voted mostly for the Congress and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). These two main parties formed a coalition government led by the PDP's leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as chief minister. He adopted a conciliatory policy of releasing all the militants who had been imprisoned in an effort to bring them back

into the mainstream of society as part of "healing touch".

In the face of increasing international criticism for not checking cross-border terrorism by the Jehadis, on August 12, General Musharraf proposed a cease-fire along the LOC, if India reciprocated by reducing its forces in the Valley and ending its "atrocities." India dismissed this initiative as nothing new. On 22nd October, as a Diwali (festival of lights) offer, the Vajpayee government announced another major peace initiative that included resumption of cricket games, railways and airlines, and bus service links between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad (Pakistan – administered Kashmir); a ferry service between Bombay and Karachi, and a railway link between Munaba in Rajasthan (India) and Kokropar in Sind Province. It also offered to talk to the Hurriyat's moderate faction led by Moulvi Abbas Ansari, which was readily welcomed by Ansari. The hardliners who opposed the talks were led by Syed Ali Shah of Gamaat-e-Islami, a Pro-Pakistani group that split with the ALAC in September 2003 and formed its own faction consisting of thirteen other parties. Although Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Riaz Khokhar, rankled India by suggesting that bus service between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad required UN documents, and offered to provide free treatment for widows and rape victims of Indian security forces negotiations continued. Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali on 23rd November welcomed India's proposals suggesting additional roads between Lahore and Amritsar (India). Subsequently, these links were restored.

Continued Growth of Islamic Terrorism: Prevention

In October 2003, reflecting on progress after two years of waging the global war on terrorism, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked his advisers: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the Madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us ? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort to stop terrorism. The cost-benefit ratio is against us. Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions." These are the right questions. Our answer is that we need short-term action on a long-range strategy, one that invigorates our foreign policy with the attention that the President and Congress have given to the military and intelligence parts of the conflict against Islamist terrorism. (Wirsing, 1998,p71)

Recent Developments:

India continues to assert their sovereignty or rights over the entire region of Kashmir, while Pakistan maintains that it is a disputed territory. Pakistan argues that the status quo cannot be considered as a solution. Pakistan insists on a UN sponsored plebiscite. Unofficially, the Pakistani leadership has indicated that they would be willing to accept alternatives such as a demilitarized Kashmir, if sovereignty of Azad Kashmir was to be extended over the Kashmir valley, or the 'Chenab' formula, by which India would retain parts of Kashmir on its side of the Chenab river, and Pakistan the other side - effectively re-partitioning Kashmir on communal lines.

The problem however is that the Population of Pakistan Administered portion of Kashmir is both ethnically and linguistically and culturally different from that in Kashmir Valley in India. In the Azad Kashmir, most of the population are ethnic Punjabis. Therefore, a Partition on the Chenab formula is opposed by most Kashmiri politicians from all spectrums, though some, such as Sajjad Lone, have in recent months suggested that non-Muslim part of Jammu and Kashmir may be separated from Kashmir and handed to India.

Some political analysts say that the Pakistan terrorist state policy shift and mellowing down of its aggressive stance may have to do with its total failure in the Kargil War and the subsequent 9/11 attacks that put pressure on Pakistan to alter its terrorist position. Further, many neutral parties to the dispute have noted that UN resolution on Kashmir is no longer relevant.(Evans,2001,p39) Even the Hurriyat Conference observed in 2003, that "Plebiscite is no longer an option". Besides, the popular factions that support either parties, there is a third faction which supports independence and withdrawal of both India and Pakistan. These have been the respective stands of the parties for long, and there have been no significant change over the years. As a result, all efforts to solve the conflict have been futile so far.

What to Do--A Global Strategy?

Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred with the full support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people. Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. The United States should consider *what to do*—the shape and objectives of a

strategy. Americans should also consider *how to do it*—organizing their government in a different way.

The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a broad political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to Attack terrorists and their organizations; prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

More Than a War on Terrorism:

Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy. Our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations. Calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their allies in the field, notably in Afghanistan. The language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort. Yet the strategy should be balanced. The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.(Jha,1996,p176)

Certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter terrorism. Terrorists should no longer find safe heaven where their organizations can grow and flourish. America's strategy should be a coalition strategy that includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation. Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military. The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world, in all its variety. Our strategy should also include defenses. America can be attacked in many ways and has much vulnerability. No defenses are perfect. But risks must be calculated; hard choices must be made about allocating resources. Responsibilities for America's defense should be clearly defined. Planning does make a difference, identifying where a little money might have a large effect. Defenses also complicate the plans of attackers, increasing their risks of discovery and failure. Finally, the nation must prepare to deal with attacks that are not stopped. (Jha,1996,p181)

Reorganizing the Government: A Different Way

India confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses.

India recommends significant changes in the context of reorganising the government. It is known that the quality of the people is more important than the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual officials straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad structures which they should not. India has the resources and the people. The government should combine them more effectively, achieving unity of effort (Joshi, 1999,p132) Five major recommendations are offered to do that:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;

- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;

- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;

- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability;

Combining Joint Intelligence and Joint Action:

A “smart” government would *integrate* all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence. Yet the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, while it has primary responsibility for terrorism analysis, is formally proscribed from having any oversight or operational authority and is not part of any operational entity, other than reporting to the director of central intelligence.

in different ways i.e. agencies with lead responsibility for certain problems have constructed their own interagency entities and task forces in order to get cooperation. The Counterterrorist Center at CIA, for example, recruits liaison officers from throughout the intelligence community. The military’s Central Command has its own interagency center, recruiting liaison officers from all the agencies from which it might need help.

Conclusion:

Firstly, it has looked at the genesis and the continuity of Indo–Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. Secondly, it has examined the efforts made by India and Pakistan in trying to resolve the conflict and why these efforts have failed. Thirdly, observations are made towards the recent joint statement and the factors leading to its declaration. Fourthly, suggestions are given with alternative solutions to the conflict and also given reasons why one particular option may be more acceptable to all parties. Finally, discussions are made towards the possibilities of success of the last agreement and with a degree of skepticism looked at why the Pakistani military and the ISI may not want to accept the proposed alternatives.

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